A Phenomenological Approach to Historical Knowledge

Abstract

The achievements of history are there for all to see, yet the basis of these achievements remains in doubt. Some continue to suspect that history is merely an assemblage of facts and opinions lacking the theoretical structure necessary to a genuine science. Others attempt to contort the actual practices of historians into a logical form resembling that of some model such as physics. Even those who have been more sensitive to the actualities of historical method have often concentrated on analyzing the peculiarity of historical explanation in relation to explanation in natural science. If one adds to these recent conflicts the still resonating claims of relativism and idealism, it is apparent that as far as the foundations of the discipline of history are concerned we still have a long way to go. What is the contribution of in this situation? On the one hand, it offers an approach which, unlike the positivistic or unity of science viewpoints, can do justice to the actual practices of historians while at the same time offering a rigorous analysis of the foundations of historical knowledge. On the other hand, it has the advantage over linguistic analysis of being oriented directly to the problem of the nature of historical reality and its relation to historical method. Before we can indicate the path of a phenomenological approach to the problem of historical knowledge, we must say what is. In the last seventy years has become many things. In addition to its influence on philosophers so varied in outlook as Max Scheler, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and John Wild, it has shaped theoretical reflection in various disciplines such as sociology (Schutz), psychiatry (Binswanger), and religion (Van der Leeuw). Unfortunately, the tendency to refer to almost any descriptive treatment of a subject as phenomenology has diluted the meaning of the term. Often works which refer to themselves as phenomenological are lacking in any methodological stringency or are simply inspired by a rejection of naturalism.1 Given such a state of affairs it is incumbent on anyone pro-