A perspective of primelot on urban political economy: The buildings of urban regime and growth machine

Abstract

As a phenomenon of urban political economy,urban primelot is an inevitable consequence of the development of urban political economy in China recently.Firstly,this paper reviews the theory of urban political economy at home and abroad;then explains the phenomenon of primelot through theories of urban regime and growth machine by analyzing the mechanism of each interest group behind this setting.It reveals that urban primelot is an urban political economy aftermath of the interactions between different political economy groups in the area of land development.This study also indicates that there are four features in this urban setting.(1) Local government is the core in this growth coalition that dominates other parts or agents/agencies,for the local offices need not care too much about their parochial civilian as well as their superior in Chinese appointed bureaucracy system.(2) The central government not only has the absolute,but final macro controls over the growth coalition as well,however,these leaders are hesitating to disorganize the local growth machines or coalitions since it may jeopardize national economic locomotive which has been lasting for over three decades since Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening up policy started in 1978.(3) Growth coalition and anti-growth coalition constitute a kind of cooperate-collide continuum.The more peripheral individuals or organizations who are distributed away from the center of core-benefit in the building of growth machines might be more inclined to throw themselves into the lap of anti-growth coalition.(4) The category of urban growth machines or urban regimes might differentiate within the development of national citizenship in historical scale and the economic capacity of local governments in geographical scale.In the areas open wider to the ourside world,such as Beijing and Shanghai,the municipalities would rather build somewhat concessionary regimes/federalist regime than conserving regime/elitist entrepreneurial regime in which the local governments are hungry for development capital and dream for achievements.Therefore,according to the structure of building,dynamic machine and self-organization of growth coalitions,the nationalization process of land market might be necessary to disconnect the coalition through pumping more investment capital into local authorities from the central government or deducing the social consumption responsibility of local governments by the central government.