Abstract
On David Lewis’s influential view, modal facts supervene on the mosaic of non-modal facts about sparse natural properties. This chapter defends a Lewisian account of laws that abandons this supervenience claim in order to avoid the objections of subjectivity and lack of necessity that bedeviled Lewis’s original view. On the author’s view, it is not the Humean mosaic of sparse natural properties that ultimately grounds laws of nature. Instead, it is the (always renegotiable) balance between our ever changing and perspectival standards of simplicity and strength that grounds laws of nature. This view reveals some unexpected resources available to a Humean account of lawhood, at the price of dispensing with Humean supervenience.
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