A Parrondo paradoxical interplay of reciprocity and reputation in social dynamics

Abstract

Our study investigates the role of reciprocity and reputation in shaping social dynamics within networks. We uncover this by creating a model network with agents who follow unique beliefs and rules. While relying solely on either reciprocity or reputation often leads to negative outcomes for a group, combining these strategies leads to unexpectedly positive results. This finding, akin to the counterintuitive Parrondo’s paradox, illustrates the hidden potential of integrating different social strategies in boosting group welfare. This work has implications for understanding and leveraging the physics of social dynamics, such as understanding the ‘Goldilocks domain’ for different population sizes and Burt’s theory for structural holes. This article sheds light on the nuanced interrelations between reciprocity and reputation and emphasizes their impact on social welfare, offering valuable insights for taking the first steps in enhancing collective welfare in social networks.