Abstract
AbstractThe following principles may plausibly be included in a wide range of theories of epistemic justification: There are circumstances in which an agent is justified in believing a falsehood, There are circumstances in which an agent is justified in believing a principle of epistemic justification, Beliefs acquired in compliance with a justifiably‐believed epistemic principle are justified. I argue that it follows from these three individually plausible claims that an agent's belief may be both justified and unjustified. I consider how theories may avoid this paradox, and conclude that deontological theories of epistemic justification face considerable, perhaps insurmountable, difficulties.
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