A numerical algorithm with preference statements to evaluate the performance of scientists.

Abstract

Academic evaluation committees have been increasingly receptive for using the number of published indexed articles, as well as citations, to evaluate the performance of scientists. It is, however, impossible to develop a stand-alone, objective numerical algorithm for the evaluation of academic activities, because any evaluation necessarily includes subjective preference statements. In a market, the market prices represent preference statements, but scientists work largely in a non-market context. I propose a numerical algorithm that serves to determine the distribution of reward money in Mexico’s evaluation system, which uses relative prices of scientific goods and services as input. The relative prices would be determined by an evaluation committee. In this way, large evaluation systems (like Mexico’s Sistema Nacional de Investigadores) could work semi-automatically, but not arbitrarily or superficially, to determine quantitatively the academic performance of scientists every few years. Data of 73 scientists from the Biology Institute of Mexico’s National University are analyzed, and it is shown that the reward assignation and academic priorities depend heavily on those preferences. A maximum number of products or activities to be evaluated is recommended, to encourage quality over quantity.