Abstract
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), a widely used public-key cipher suitable for embedded systems, is vulnerable to simple power analysis (SPA) attacks. There are many countermeasures against SPA attacks on ECC implementations, among which the Always-add algorithm is a popular one. This research proposes a novel SPA attack to break Always-add ECC implementations. We identify a new leakage that is not directly related to the key bits, but related to the differential of twoconsecutive key bits. We employ deep-learning tools and statistical methods to retrieve the complete ECC private key, from only one electromagnetic trace collected from an ASIC implementation of Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman (ECDH) key agreement protocol.--Author's abstract
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
