A Novel Security Survival Model for Quantum Key Distribution Networks Enabled by Software-Defined Networking

Abstract

Quantum-key-distribution (QKD) networks can theoretically generate quantum secret keys that are completely secure for an entire communication system. The rate of key distribution is low and decreases exponentially with increasing distance. A classic trusted relay (CTR) uses additional keys to enhance security distance in QKD networks. In practice, the assurance of security for certain relay nodes is still lacking, despite the fact that CTR requires that all nodes be trusted. Owing to channel unreliability, system faults accumulate during the key relay, thereby increasing the probability of CTR failing to distribute the secret key. The failure of a successful key relay would then result in the subsequent destruction of all the keys involved in the process, which leads to the wasting of the quantum secret key and reduction system encryption. Accordingly, reducing the impact of CTR failures and realising the key security distribution of remote quantum networks have become new challenges that require the development of a new survivability scheme. In this study, a software-defined networking (SDN) technique is introduced to circumvent this drawback by utilising the flexibility provided by the SDN paradigm for better QKD network management efficiency. In particular, a novel survivability model called software-defined quantum key relay failure (SDQKRF) is proposed in this paper in which a new function is developed and added to the SDN controller. According to the simulation results, SDN over a QKD network using the SDQKRF model is more reliable and performs better in terms of the key generation ratio, key utilisation rate, recovery after failure, avalanche effect, and service blocking rate than a regular QKD network without the SDQTRF model.