Abstract
Pluralistic ignorance, a well-documented socio-psychological conformity phenomenon, involves discrepancies between private attitude and public opinion in certain social contexts. However, continuous opinion dynamics models based on a bounded confidence assumption fail to accurately model pluralistic ignorance because they do not address scenarios in which non-conformists do not need to worry about holding and expressing conflicting opinions. Such scenarios reduce the power of continuous opinion dynamics models to explain why certain groups doubt or change their opinions in response to minority views. To simulate the effects of (a) private acceptance of informational social influence and (b) public compliance with normative social influence on pluralistic ignorance and minority influences, we have created an agent-based simulation model in which attitude and opinion respectively represent an agent's private and expressed thoughts. Results from a series of simulation experiments indicate model validity equal to or exceeding those of existing opinion dynamics models that are also based on the bounded confidence assumption, but with different dynamics and outcomes in terms of collective opinion and attitude. The results also support the use of our proposed model for computational social psychology applications.
Highlights
1.1 As in the fable of "The Emperor's New Clothes", individual opinions and behaviors often clash with internal attitudes, values, beliefs, and morals ( Sekiguchi & Nakamaru 2011)
Unlike informational social influence, normative social influence often results in public compliance involving simple changes in behaviors and opinions to fit with the perspectives of one's community, without changing one's internal attitudes or beliefs (Allen 1965)
According to our simulation results, if a small number of newcomers are added to a group in which a consensus has already been achieved, and the newcomers' initial opinions and attitudes are randomly distributed, most of the newcomers will choose public compliance due to the magnitude of public opinion
Summary
1.1 As in the fable of "The Emperor's New Clothes", individual opinions and behaviors often clash with internal attitudes, values, beliefs, and morals ( Sekiguchi & Nakamaru 2011). When RED < u < 1, 0 < green < 1 − RED and red = RED (Figure 2e), indicating a high level of agent uncertainty, lack of insistence on keeping its original attitude, and greater potential to be affected by public opinion and to change as a result.
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