Abstract

Large-scale demand response (DR) is a useful regulatory method used in high proportion renewable energy sources (RES) integration power systems. Current incentive-based DR schemes are unsuitable for large-scale DR due to their centralized formulation. This paper proposes a distributed scheme to support large-scale implementation of DR. To measure DR performance, this paper proposes the customer directrix load (CDL), which is a desired load profile, to replace the customer baseline load (CBL). The uniqueness of CDL makes it more suitable for distributed schemes, while numerous CBLs have to be calculated in a centralized manner to ensure fairness. To allocate DR tasks and rebates, this paper proposes a distributed approach, where the load serving entity (LSE) only needs to publish a total rebate and corresponding CDL. As for each customer, s/he needs to claim an ideal rebate ratio that ranges from 0 to 1, which indicates the proportion of rebate s/he wants to get from LSE. The rebate value for each customer also determines his or her DR task. Then, the process of customer claims for the ideal rebate ratio is modeled as a non-cooperative game, and the Nash equilibrium is proved to exist. The Gossip algorithm is improved in this paper to be suitable for socially connected networks, and the entire game process is distributed. Finally, a large-scale DR system is formulated. The simulation results show that the proposed DR can promote the consumption of RES. Additionally, this scheme is suitable for large-scale customer systems, and the distributed game process is effective.

Highlights

  • High proportion renewable energy sources (RES) integration can effectively solve many environmental issues; it will be one of the characteristics in future power systems [1]

  • If the Demand response (DR) event needs to be implemented, the load serving entity (LSE) will broadcast a total rebate for all the customers who participate in the DR

  • It should be noted that every customer determines their rebate ratio greedily; after gathering all the rebate ratios, LSE will calculate the actual ratio k∗i (t) for each customer, which ensures that the total rebate ratio K (t) will not exceed the “1”: K (t) = ∑i∈I k i (t)

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Summary

Introduction

High proportion renewable energy sources (RES) integration can effectively solve many environmental issues; it will be one of the characteristics in future power systems [1]. Large-scale DR requires solving these two issues; this paper focuses on how to operate DR resources on an aggregated level and how to measure each customer’s performance. In a real-time economic dispatch, due to the intermittent and stochastic characteristics of RES, the reserve capacity of conventional generators may not be enough and DR events will occur With this background, our work focuses on designing a novel scheme to allocate DR resources and DR rebates to numerous customers. The LSE only needs to publish a total DR rebate and corresponding DR regulation goal to the demand side through social networks, and customer claims for an ideal rebate are performed in a distributed manner This process is modeled as a non-cooperative game, and the Nash equilibrium is proven to exist.

Timeline of the Proposed DR Scheme
CDL-Based
Broadcast Total Rebate
Customer Model
Formulation of Non-Cooperative Game
It we is fitted well with
2: Gossip algorithm each DR customer
Flowchart
Case Study
Results about
Conventional
Simulation Results of the Non-Cooperative Game of Customers
The non-cooperative process for every customers’
Impacts of RES and DR Percentage and Rebate Rate Factor in the DR Scheme
Conclusions
Full Text
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