A novel approach in strategic planning of power networks against physical attacks

Abstract

The reported work points at developing a practical approach for power transmission planners to secure power networks from potential deliberate attacks. We study the interaction between a system planner (defender) and a rational attacker who threatens the operation of power grid. In addition to the commonly used hardening strategy for protecting the network, a new sort of resource is introduced under the deception concept. Feint and deception are acknowledged as effective tools for misleading the attacker in strategic planning. To this end, the defender deception is mathematically formulated by releasing misinformation about his plan in the shared cognition-based model. To reduce the risk of damage in case of deception failure, preemptive-goal programming is utilized to prioritize the hardening strategy for the vital components. Furthermore, the “value of posturing” is introduced which is the benefits that the deception brings to the system. The problems are formulated as tri-level mixed-integer linear programming and solved by constraint-and-column generation method. Comprehensive simulation studies performed on WSCC 9-bus and IEEE 118-bus systems indicate how the defender will save significant cost from protecting his network with posturing rather than hardening and the proposed approach is a promising development to ensure the secure operation of power networks.