Abstract
This note considers a two-period model of a fishery exploited by two firms selling their harvests in separate local markets. Assuming the harvesting cost is a private information to the firms, there is an agency that can regulate the market. I propose a contract in the realm of yardstick competition framework that allows the regulator to solve the information asymmetry problem and achieve cooperation.
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