Abstract
Abstract University admission mechanisms are often quite complex. This paper examines one effect of their design on the students’ incentives to exert effort in preparation for the test. We adapt a multi-unit all-pay model of auction to draw the conclusion that abler students work harder: this conclusion is in line with the behaviour of a sample of students who apply for admission to the Greek university system with the complex rules newly introduced in 2013.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callMore From: The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
