Abstract
The public good index (PGI) measures a priori power in coalition games while interpreting the coalition value as a public good. It was axiomatized by Holler and Packet (1983), which greatly facilitated a comparison with other power measures. This note fills a gap that was left in the original axiomatization: the independence and non-redundancy of the four Holler-Packel axioms are demonstrated. Holler and Packet’s axiomatization of the PGI — and thus this completion — is of relevance not only for the PGI itself but also for another power index, the member bargaining power measure (MBP).
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