Abstract
Following the results of Nakamura (1979) and Muto (1984), we derive, for a given proper voting game G, the upper bound on the size of the space of alternatives, which guarantees that the core constitutes a von Neumann-Morgenstern solution for any profile of voter's preferences. In particular, we show that if the space of alternatives consists of more than two elements, then, in general, the core is not a von Neumann-Morgenstern solution.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
