Abstract

Dunn has recently argued that the logic R-Mingle (or RM) is a good, and good enough, choice for many purposes in relevant and paraconsistent logic. This includes an argument that the validity of Safety principle, according to which one may infer an arbitrary instance of the law of excluded middle from an arbitrary contradiction, in RM is not a problem because it doesn’t allow one to infer anything new from a contradiction. In this paper, I argue that while Dunn’s claim holds for the logic, there is a good reason to think that it’s not the case for (prime) theories closed under the logic, and that this should give relevantists, and some paraconsistentists, pause when considering whether RM is adequate for their purposes.

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