A note on mental content in the Causal Theory

JP Smit

doi:10.5774/42-0-138

Abstract

Kripke's causal theory requires that downstream users of a name must have the intention to use the name in the same way that upstream users did. Kripke, however, has demonstrated no need for this requirement qua independent condition. He is antecedently committed to a distinction between baptismal use and downstream use. Any plausible construal of this distinction will block the problem that this condition is supposed to solve.

Highlights

Kripke’s basic theory of the reference of names is that a name N refers to the individual baptised N at the origin of the causal chain for N. The simplicity of this theory is somewhat misleading as Kripke requires that the causal chains in question must be “of the required type” (1981:96n). He explains this condition by saying that “[w]hen the name is ‘passed from link to link’ the receiver of the name must, I think, intend when he learns it to use it with the same reference as the man from whom he heard it” (Kripke 1981:96)
The Consistent Reference Intention (CRI) Condition implies that the causal theory is not purely externalist, i.e. the theory does not make reference completely independent of mental content
There is another potential source of mental content in the causal theory, namely the need to explain what a “baptism” consists in and the attendant need to distinguish baptismal use from the downstream use of a name

Summary

Introduction

Kripke’s basic theory of the reference of names is that a name N refers to the individual baptised N at the origin of the causal chain for N. The simplicity of this theory is somewhat misleading as Kripke requires that the causal chains in question must be “of the required type” (1981:96n).

Results

Conclusion