Abstract
This paper evaluates the discrete bid first-price sealed-bid (FPSB) auction in a model with a general value distribution. We show that a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists for the discrete bid FPSB auction. We further prove that the discrete bid FPSB equilibrium conditionally converges to that of a continuous bid FPSB auction.
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