Abstract
The Volterra theory of two competing populations is extended to the contemporary social problem of crime control. Domains of stability for the time dependence of the numbers in the criminal and enforcement groups are exposed by a numerical example. Both augmentation and reduction of enforcement can produce a stable system. Average values of the ratio of members in each group show great sensitivity to the control policies adopted by the remaining sector of the total population.
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