Abstract
Boghossian (1996) develops and defends an epistemic notion of analyticity. In doing so he highlights the inherent difficulty of rejecting both meaning realism and analyticity. In this note I defend his argument against two attacks (Margolis & Laurence 2001; Harman 1996) that misconstrue his arguments in a way that does little except to facilitate unjustified dismissal.
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