A Non-Vacuist Response to the Counterpossible Terrible Commands Objection

Abstract

AbstractCritics of Divine Command Theory (DCT) argue that DCT implies the following counterpossible is true: If God commanded us to perform a terrible act, then the terrible act would be morally obligatory. However, our intuitions tell us that such a counterpossible is false. Therefore, DCT fails. This is the counterpossible terrible commands objection. In this paper, I argue that the counterpossible terrible commands objection fails. I start by considering a standard response by DCT proponents that appeals to vacuism—the view that all counterpossibles are vacuously true. I argue that DCT proponents should pursue a different response instead. I then go on to provide a new response to the counterpossible terrible commands objection: I argue that we lack reason to think that the counterpossible in question is false by examining the underlying intuitions.