Abstract
I consider a class of Bayesian bargaining problems in which the neutral bargaining solution selects the ex ante worst mechanism among all of the interim incentive efficient mechanisms. Within this class of examples, I examine a logical foundation of the neutral bargaining solution by analyzing the the informed principal's selection of a mechanism as part of a noncooperative game.
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