Abstract
In this paper we address the question of how to allocate the total cost of building and maintaining an airport runway among its users based on a non-cooperative approach. We present a non-cooperative bargaining game with a unique Nash equilibrium outcome whose payoffs are the Shapley value of an airport problem. Furthermore, it is shown that all strategy profiles leading to a subgame perfect equilibrium in these games are also coalition-proof.
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