Abstract
We present a new NTU value, which generalises the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution to NTU games using three approaches. In the first section, we define the new NTU value as the only efficient point in the segment defined by an upper and a lower bound. Next, we define a bargaining procedure and prove that this procedure leads to a single, subgame perfect equilibrium payoff vector, which coincides with the new NTU value. Finally, we characterise the new value using several properties.
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