Abstract
This paper explores the economic performance of a fishery that operates under an individual transferable quota (ITQs) management system and that is subject to an in-season stock externality. While Boyce (1992) and others have established theoretically that ITQ management is not fully efficient under all conditions, this is the first study that empirically estimates the efficiency losses due to an in-season stock externality in an actual fishery. We study the New Zealand southern scallop fishery, which has been under ITQ management since 1992. Our analysis provides evidence of a race-to-fish in the fishery, and estimates that individual firm profits were approximately $2,300 and $2,000 (20% and 10%) less in 1996 and 1997, respectively, than they would have been under optimal management. We recommend modifications in the ITQ policy to improve the economic performance of the fishery.
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