A New “pragmatism”

Abstract

Recently, Germany's anglo-saxon allies, in particular, have begun to wonder about future role of Germany within Atlantic alliance. To some allies, Germany has even become the new eroding NATO and aiming to build a counterweight to U S -led transatlantic pillar.1 While such observations are widely off mark, it seems that Germany's recent NATO policy has indeed been characterized by increasing pragmatism. This pragmatism means that Germany perceives NATO as only one of a range of security instruments and is more willing to openly challenge allies on positions it regards as running counter to German interests.The analysis here examines major factors leading to a change in Germany's approach towards alliance. It proceeds in three broad steps. First, evidence for a shift in German NATO policy is provided. Second, most important external and domestic factors affecting German behaviour in NATO are identified. In final section, some predictions for future German NATO policy are made, as well as some implications for alliance as a whole.MORE DISCORD THAN COLLABORATIONIn recent years German governments, sometimes backed by other western European allies such as France and Belgium, have publicly raised objections within NATO on a number of strategic issues. Germany has often found itself in direct opposition to US positions. Given that during Cold War, Germany was a reliable ally to Washington, voicing concerns only behind closed doors and in end mostly following changes in US policy, such behaviour suggests emergence of a shift in German relations with NATO. Indeed, empirical evidence supports notion that German policy toward NATO over recent years has been marked more by discord than by collaboration. The disagreements include both conceptual and operational issues of importance to NATO's strategic agility.The NATO-led international security assistance force (ISAF) in Afghanistan is most prominent example. The German government of Chancellor Angela Merkel has made it clear that it wishes to pursue a different concept of alliance solidarity and burden-sharing by not sending regular combat troops into south Afghanistan. Even though mandate would allow deployment to south, Berlin has insisted on German personnel staying in north. Such political caveats on use of German troops have led to fierce criticism by allies such as Canada and Great Britain. Furthermore, many German experts concur with their government's policy, arguing that Afghan mission does not represent a case of alliance solidarity. In their view, each NATO member should choose its individual force contributions according to its own interests and risk-assessment.2 While technically this argument is correct, anglo-saxon allies hardly share such a view politically. Finally, German policymakers so far have not agreed with their allies' assessment that NATO's ISAF is now engaged in a fully fledged counterinsurgency operation.3 Thus, while German troops have contributed to stability in northern Afghanistan since 2005, Berlin has also played its part in hindering alliance's ability to find common ground on a comprehensive Afghan strategy.The US -led military campaign to remove Iraqi regime in 2003 demonstrated that Germany would no longer willingly play along with major revisions in US foreign and security policy, in this case goal to transform Middle East with force. The government of then-Chancellor Gerhard Schroder vehemently opposed US plans. Berlin did not (as in past) opt for critical consultations behind closed doors, e.g., at North Atlantic Council, but chose a public confrontation with United States government. By closely coordinating this opposition with France, Russia, and China at United Nations security council, Berlin accepted emergence of counterbalancing behaviour towards United States.4 In February 2003, Germany, together with France, undermined NATO's ability to act by blocking a proposal to supply Turkey with military equipment to help defend country in case of war with Iraq. …