Abstract
The newly established International Criminal Court (ICC) promises justice to the victims of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Past offenders can be punished, while future potential offenders may be deterred by the prospect of punishment. Yet, justice is no substitute for intervention for the benefit of people at acute risk of being victimized. The Court may create a new moral hazard problem if the promise of ex post justice makes it easier for states to shy away from incurring the costs of intervention. This article indirectly tests for the relevance of this potential problem by estimating the determinants of ratification delay to the Rome Statute of the ICC. If the Court represents an excuse for inaction, then countries that are unwilling or unable to intervene in foreign conflicts should be among its prime supporters. Results show instead that countries that in the past have been more willing to intervene in foreign civil wars and more willing to contribute troops to multinational peacekeeping missions are more likely to have ratified the Statute (early on). This suggests that the Court is a complement to, not a substitute for intervention.
Highlights
The creation of an International Criminal Court (ICC) has been hailed by many as a major breakthrough in international law. Weller (2002: 693), for example, has called it ‘the culmination of international law-making of the twentieth century’
Countries that intervene more in foreign civil conflicts and contribute more to multinational peacekeeping abroad are statistically significantly more likely to have ratified the Rome Statute
For the first time in the history of humankind, there exists the general possibility of prosecuting political leaders as well as ordinary citizens who have committed crimes of genocide, war crimes as well as crimes against humanity before an international court with quasi-universal jurisdiction
Summary
The creation of an International Criminal Court (ICC) has been hailed by many as a major breakthrough in international law. Weller (2002: 693), for example, has called it ‘the culmination of international law-making of the twentieth century’. We test whether countries that have been more willing in the past to intervene militarily in conflicts abroad and who have contributed more often troops to multinational peacekeeping are more or less likely to have ratified the Rome Statute (early on).
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