Abstract

Key predistribution for wireless sensor networks has been a challenging field of research because stringent resource constraints make the key predistribution schemes difficult to implement. Despite this, key predistribution scheme is regarded as the best option for key management in wireless sensor networks. Here, the authors have proposed a new key predistribution scheme. This scheme exhibits better performance than existing schemes of its kind. Moreover, our scheme ensures constant time of key establishment between two nodes. We provide some bounds on the resiliency of this scheme. Next, we use this new key predistribution scheme in a grid-group deployment of sensor nodes. The entire deployment zone is broken into square regions. The sensor nodes falling within a single square region can communicate directly. Sensor nodes belonging to different square regions can communicate by means of special nodes deployed in each of the square region. We measure the resiliency in terms of fraction of links disconnected as well as fraction of nodes and regions disconnected. We show that our key predistribution scheme when applied to grid-group deployment performs better than standard models in existence.

Highlights

  • Key predistribution in wireless sensor networks has attracted attention of researchers for a decade

  • Key predistribution schemes are classified into two groups viz. probabilistic key predistribution and deterministic key predistribution

  • In probabilistic key predistribution scheme, as the name implies, the keys are randomly drawn from a large pool of keys and are placed into the individual sensor nodes

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Summary

Introduction

Key predistribution in wireless sensor networks has attracted attention of researchers for a decade. Ruj and Roy [18] proposed a key predistribution for grid-group-based deployment In this scheme, the deployment area is divided into smaller square regions. We propose a key predistribution scheme for homogeneous wireless sensor networks using the scheme of Blom [4] as well as symmetric balanced incomplete block design (SBIBD). In order to disconnect an uncaptured node from all other nodes, the adversary needs to capture many more nodes than the other standard schemes We use this new key predistribution scheme in a grid-group deployment of sensor nodes. It has been proved that the above scheme is c-secure [4], i.e., if any c + 1 columns of G are linearly independent; no member other than Ux and Uy can compute Kxy or Kyx if no more than c members are compromised

A construction for matrix G
Proposed scheme
The scheme
Proof of correctness of algorithms
Conclusions
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