Abstract
This chapter introduces a new theoretical framework for understanding the interplay between religion and morality politics in those European countries that have experienced secularization trends yet still have a strong religious-secular cleavage in their party system. The primary argument is that the rise and fall of religion in the politics of these countries is dependent on the presumed competitive advantage that secular and religious political parties expect when politicizing morality issues. This presumed competitive advantage strongly depends on the power position of these political parties (i.e. being in government or not) and the unity in policy preferences toward morality issues within government. Two specific arguments are deduced to explain oscillating parliamentary attention on morality policies and its impact on policy change: (1) Political parties in opposition will politicize a topic if doing so has the possibility of successfully dividing the government (wedge-issue competition), and (2) high parliamentary issue attention is negatively related to the extent of policy change on the short run but positively related to policy change on the long run (via venue shifts and policy image changes).
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