Abstract
Iris has been found to be unique and consistent over time despite its random nature. Unprotected biometric (iris) template raises concerns in security and privacy, as numerous large-scale iris recognition projects have been deployed worldwide—for instance, susceptibility to attacks, cumbersome renewability, and cross-matching. Template protection schemes from biometric cryptosystems and cancelable biometrics are expected to restore the confidence in biometrics regarding data privacy, given the great advancement in recent years. However, a majority of the biometric template protection schemes have uncertainties in guaranteeing criteria such as unlinkability, irreversibility, and revocability, while maintaining significant performance. Fuzzy commitment, a theoretically secure biometric key binding scheme, is vulnerable due to the inherent dependency of the biometric features and its reliance on error correction code (ECC). In this paper, an alignment-free and cancelable iris key binding scheme without ECC is proposed. The proposed system protects the binary biometric data, i.e., IrisCodes, from security and privacy attacks through a strong and size varying non-invertible cancelable transform. The proposed scheme provides flexibility in system storage and authentication speed via controllable hashed code length. We also proposed a fast key regeneration without either re-enrollment or constant storage of seeds. The experimental results and security analysis show the validity of the proposed scheme.
Highlights
Biometric technology, biometric authentication, has been implemented widely in many applications
While both Biometric Cryptosystem (BCS) and CB fulfill the requirement of biometric template protection, there are still remaining issues and drawbacks being raised in terms of security, privacy, and performance
We demonstrated the calculation of Key Retrieval Rate (KRR) under certain configurations and its implementation in security analysis for indistinguishability game as well as false accept attacks
Summary
Biometric authentication, has been implemented widely in many applications. The limitations of traditional cryptographic key management incorporating passwords can be meliorated by biometric authentication It is still vulnerable, as biometric data can be intercepted, stolen, altered, and replayed. Keys can be generated directly from the helper data and a given query biometric template These schemes are known as fuzzy extractors or secure sketch, as defined in [9,10]. Performance: The accuracy of the cancelable template in recognition performance must be approximately preserved with respect to its original counterparts without the template protection scheme While both BCS and CB fulfill the requirement of biometric template protection, there are still remaining issues and drawbacks being raised in terms of security, privacy, and performance.
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