A new construction of leakage-resilient CCA secure IBE scheme

Abstract

Leakage of private information has become a threat to the security of cryptography systems. It has become a common security requirement that a cryptography scheme should withstand various leakage attacks. The non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) argument system, one-time lossy filter (OT-LF) and one-time signature were widely used to create the generic constructions of leakage-resilient identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme with chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) security. However, the computational efficiency of the corresponding generic construction is low because the underlying cryptographic tool is low. Thus, to solve the above problem, a new cryptographic primitive, called identity-based hash proof system with two encapsulated-key (T-IB-HPS), is proposed. The new generic constructions of leakage resilient IBE scheme with CCA security is created from the T-IB-HPS and message authentication code (MAC), and the security of the above proposed scheme is proved from the security of the underlying cryptographic tool. To further show the practicability, an instantiation of T-IB-HPS is constructed, and the formal security proof of the above instantiation is shown based on the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption. Compared with the previous generic constructions of leakage resilient IBE scheme with CCA security, since the underlying cryptographic tools with low computational efficiency are not used, our generic construction has high computational efficiency.