Abstract
We consider values for transferable utility coalitional form games. We impose on values the requirements of efficiency, triviality, coalitional strategic equivalence, and fair ranking. Efficiency requires that the payoffs to players exhaust all benefits generated by forming the grand coalition. Triviality requires that all players receive nothing if the game is trivial. Coalitional strategic equivalence requires that an improvement in the technology available to some coalition would not affect the payoffs of the players that do not belong to the coalition. Fair ranking requires that the relative payoffs of players belonging to some coalition be determined by their contributions to other coalitions. We show that these four axioms uniquely characterize the Shapley value.
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