A network interdiction model for analyzing the vulnerability of water distribution systems

Abstract

This article presents a network interdiction model to assess the vulnerabilities of a class of physical flow networks. A flow network is modeled by a potential function defined over the nodes and a flow function defined over arcs (links). In particular, the difference in potential function between two nodes is characterized by a nonlinear flux function of the flow on link between the two nodes. To assess the vulnerability of the network to adversarial attack, the problem is formulated as an attacker-defender network interdiction model. The attacker's objective is to interdict the most valuable links of the network given his resource constraints. The defender's objective is to minimize power loss and the unmet demand in the network. A bi-level approach is explored to identify most critical links for network interdiction. The applicability of the proposed approach is demonstrated on a reference water distribution network, and its utility toward developing mitigation plans is discussed.