Abstract
We study a dynamic network formation process in which players sever or add links. The main result is that, if two players with the same number of links have an incentive to add the link and no incentive to sever the link, then the formation process can converge to the complete network when the number of players is even. We also identify two situations satisfying this assumption.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
