Abstract

AbstractI present Searle’s theory of intentionality and defend it against some objections. I then significantly extend his theory by exposing and incorporating an ambiguity in the question as to what an intentional state is about as between a subjective and an objective reading of the question. Searle implicitly relies on this ambiguity while applying his theory to a solution to the problem of substitution in propositional attitudes, but his failure to explicitly accommodate the ambiguity undermines his solution. My extension of his theory succeeds. I also indicate how the new theory can be deployed to resolve other outstanding problems.

Highlights

  • It is uncontroversial that intentional states are directed at or about something—their intentional objects

  • What accounts for this “aboutness” or “directedness” and what can be said of intentional object? Problems stem from the fact that some intentional states are “about” things that do not exist, at least not in the ordinary sense

  • Since it is here argued that intentional content is what accounts for what an intentional state is about, it is imperative that we provide an answer to (Q4)

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Summary

Introduction

It is uncontroversial that intentional states are directed at or about something—their intentional objects. On my theory the question as to what an intentional state is about is viewed as inherently ambiguous between what an agent’s intentional state is about (a) from her own subjective perspective, what she herself is thinking, her thought-token and (b) from the perspective of an objective observer of the agent.. On my theory the question as to what an intentional state is about is viewed as inherently ambiguous between what an agent’s intentional state is about (a) from her own subjective perspective, what she herself is thinking, her thought-token and (b) from the perspective of an objective observer of the agent.17 These different points of view frequently, even typically, result in the same answer. 22I thank an anonymous referee for his/her concerns about these two issues

Further explanation of the new concepts and brief recap of recent examples
12. Subjective and objective interpretations of intentional content
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