A Narrativist Revival?

Frank R Ankersmit

doi:10.1163/18722636-12341456

Abstract

Abstract Up till the 1980s narrativist philosophers of history were mainly interested in the cognitivist dimension of historical narrative. With Hayden White this interest was exchanged for an exclusive preoccupation with the literary aspects of the historian’s narrative representation of the past. However, it may seem that a revival of pre-Whitean narrativist philosophy of history is at hand. Two recent books suggest as much: one by Chiel van den Akker published in 2018 and one more by Paul Roth that came out in 2020. Obviously, a narrativist revival can take two different forms. It may aim at providing pre-Whitean narrativism with a more up-to-date philosophical basis or at guiding it into new directions. It will be argued in this review-essay that the book by Roth mainly does the former, whereas the book by Van den Akker does both.

Highlights

It may seem that a revival of pre-Whitean narrativist philosophy of history is at hand
A narrativist revival can take two different forms. It may aim at providing pre-Whitean narrativism with a more up-to-date philosophical basis or at guiding it into new directions. It will be argued in this review-essay that the book by redescription’ of part of the past (Roth) mainly does the former, whereas the book by Van den Akker does both
White was more interested in how history manifests itself in literature, film, art, psychology and politics than in professional historical writing[2] and, he appealed to literary theory when analyzing narrative, whereas Danto, Mink and Goldstein took philosophy of language as their guide

Summary

Introduction

15 Van den Akker concludes his discussion of the conceptual scheme with an exposition of Davidson’s claim that truth and translatability are indissolubly linked together – the implication being that much two languages may differ the speakers of these language can in principle, communicate meaningfully with each other on condition that they aim to speak the truth. This is one more argument against relativism. It deploys itself in a limbo between the past and the present in which no one ever lived.[24]

The Metaphysical Status of Historical Events

Conclusion