Abstract
Circular shareholding is an intriguing ownership structure that enables a major shareholder to gain control of subsidiaries with only small investments. The conflict between the public interest and corporate interest regarding circular shareholding has presented policymakers with unresolved legal issues. To support systematic decision making by policymakers in this circumstance, we propose a multi-objective bilinear optimization model to address the circular shareholding problem. The proposed model provides policymakers with various scenarios corporates could make, assuming the enforcement of regulatory law on circular shareholding along with consideration of the public interest with different weights. We also conduct computational analysis on the model with real data from conglomerates in Korea, where debates about circular shareholding are ongoing. The results show clear patterns between obtained solutions, suggesting the possibility of a quantitative basis for legislation regarding circular shareholding and corporate governance.
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