Abstract
The minilateral approach of a climate club of countries has been suggested as an intermediate phase in a transition towards a global agreement that enforces national climate policies through harmonization. To garner critical mass, we propose an extended club configuration including sub-national states or provinces, resulting in a multi-level club. This would allow considerable contributions from important emitters like the US to be brought on board, relevant given its intended withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. We elaborate this idea and clarify potential roles of participants at distinct levels. The concept is operationalized by developing a method for identifying suitable entities at each level that uses a set of likelihood-of-involvement indicators capturing existing carbon dependence, public opinion, government policy and climate coalition membership. Application at the national level identifies a subset of seven of the highest emitting countries representing 21% of global emissions. This rises to 51% assuming that China, the dominant global emitter, could be enticed into the group. Given that US involvement remains unlikely for now, we illustrate selection at the sub-national level for US states. Here, an initial group of 21 states appear as potential members, jointly accounting for 36% of national emissions. An additional group, representing a further 34% of emissions, are potentially receptive to enticement via trade dependencies on four key countries identified within the group of national members. Accordingly, some 70% of US emissions, representing 11% of global totals, may be subject to climate club involvement via a combination of these pathways. While the implementation of such a club requires various political and legal hurdles to be overcome, the ongoing threat of climate change and inadequacies of the Paris Agreement suggest that novel solutions of this kind deserve serious attention from scientists and politicians.
Highlights
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has been widely accepted as the default facilitator of global negotiations on climate issues (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and McGee 2013)
The two most ambitious initiatives undertaken by the UNFCCC far—the defunct Kyoto Protocol and the current Paris Agreement—have both relied on voluntary actions, meaning that levels of commitment and compliance among member countries have not been uniform in nature
Once critical mass is achieved, it could grow to cover the bulk of global emissions and potentially influence post-Paris UNFCCC negotiations to focus on global policy coordination rather than mere targets (Eckersley 2012, Nordhaus 2015)
Summary
Keywords: climate policy, climate club, UNFCCC, Paris Agreement, carbon import tariff Original content from this work may be used under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 licence. Any further distribution of this work must maintain attribution to the author(s) and the title of the work, journal citation and DOI.
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