A Multi-Leader One-Follower Stackelberg Game Approach for Cooperative Anti-Jamming: No Pains, No Gains

Abstract

To tackle the multi-user and multi-channel issues in anti-jamming problems, we model the problem as a multi-leader one-follow Stackelberg game. An anti-jamming mechanism with “No Pains No Gains” idea is designed. The proposed mechanism sacrifices parts of users’ benefits to trap the jammer, while the rest of users can achieve a better performance. In this way, the system’s throughput is improved. In addition, the channel bonding technology is used to enhance the robust performance and improve system throughput further. Besides the cooperative anti-jamming problem is modeled as a multi-leader one-follower Stackelberg game, the channel selection and power allocation game of leaders is also modeled as a potential game. The existence of Nash equilibrium is proved, which guarantees the Stackelberg equilibrium of users and the jammer. A joint channel selection and power allocation algorithm is modified to approach the final equilibrium. The simulation results show that the proposed anti-jamming mechanism with channel bonding achieves higher throughput and better anti-jamming performance than non-cooperative algorithms.