Abstract
Conflict between mates over the amount of parental investment by each partner is probably the rule except in rare cases of genetic monogamy. In systems with parental care, males may frequently benefit by providing smaller investments than are optimal for individual female partners. Females are therefore expected to choose males that will provide the largest amounts of parental investment. In some species, however, the preferred males provide less care than their rivals. Focusing on species in which males invest by feeding their mates, I use a simple model to demonstrate the conditions under which males preferred by females may have optimal donations that are smaller than those of less-preferred rivals. Pre-mating female choice may sufficiently bias the perception of mate availability of preferred males relative to their rivals such that preferred males gain by conserving resources for future matings. Similarly, 'cryptic' biases in favour of high-quality ejaculates by females can compensate for smaller than average donations received from preferred males. However, post-fertilization cryptic choice should not change the optimal donations of preferred males relative to their rivals. I discuss the implications of this work for understanding sexual selection in courtship-feeding animals, and the relevance of these systems to understanding patterns of investment for animals in general.
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More From: Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences
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