Abstract
We study a model of terrorism and counterterrorism with three geographic target locations, in which the last location is chosen by the terrorists and is unknown to the defender. We find the choice of location and defender’s allocation of defensive resources to depend on whether the first two locations are attacked simultaneously or sequentially. In the sequential-move game, the final attack is closer to the low-valued target than it is in the simultaneous-move game. In addition, the defender chooses to defend only the location that is attacked first in the sequential game. Results from the model also can shed light on less provocative criminal events such as bank robberies and drug dealings.
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