Abstract
This paper proposes a model of formation of signed networks that comprise both positive (friendly/cooperative) and negative (antagonistic) social ties between players who differ intrinsically in strength. Friendships/alliances serve to increase one’s power over their intrinsic strength; in the determination of power it matters not how many allies one has, but who these allies are. The model proposed here is suited to any context where players derive power from friendships/alliances with stronger players and payoffs are extracted from less powerful enemies. The structure of ties across various types of players is studied in Nash equilibria along with a characterization of Nash equilibria under various parametric conditions.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
