A Model of Judicial Influence on Congressional Policy Making: Grove City College v. Bell

Reviewed by: A Documentary History of the American Civil War. Vol. 4: Judicial Decisions, 1867–1896 ed. by Thomas C. Mackey Linda Przybyszewski A Documentary History of the American Civil War. Vol. 4: Judicial Decisions, 1867–1896. Edited by Thomas C. Mackey. Voices of the Civil War. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2014. Pp. xx, 642. $70.00, ISBN 978-1-62190-040-5.) Now that so much historical material is becoming available online, we need to consider the rationale for the printed documentary volume. After all, the many documents that can be downloaded have changed how many of us work. Only a printed collection that is well annotated by a savvy editor can justify itself these days, and this is a tall order. This volume, the fourth in a series, offers judicial opinions from courts of appeal in their entirety with short introductions to each. Its editor, Thomas C. Mackey, argues that the series provides “access to the most important (and sometimes overlooked and difficult to locate) public policy and judicial decisions” of the era (pp. xi–xii). Mackey feels that historians have been neglecting the political, legal, and constitutional history of the Civil War period in favor of social and cultural history, and he hopes that these volumes will restore the balance. The book includes a list of suggested readings highlighting many important books on the constitutional history of the Civil War and Reconstruction that readers will find useful. Mackey’s book targets historians of the mid-nineteenth century, legal scholars, undergraduate students, and the serious Civil War buffs. The book is a handsome volume for those who like their document collections bound, and it contains all of the important Supreme Court opinions of the period. However, the book has drawbacks for all of its potential audiences except the history buffs. Although it is true that the last few decades have been dominated by wonderful social histories of the Civil War (leaving legal scholars feeling a bit unloved), if there are any judicial opinions that are well known, well studied, and readily available, it is the judicial opinions of the appellate courts, especially of the U.S. Supreme Court whose decisions make up eighteen of the twenty decisions reprinted here. And a reprint is a problem for legal scholars because the convention is to reference any quotation from a state or federal [End Page 447] judicial decision by using the page numbers of the original, printed court reporters. Using anything else in a footnote would be considered odd, if not unprofessional. Law professors rely on the Westlaw database, while college professors and students use the LexisNexis database. For this reason, this collection is suitable only for those outside academic and legal circles. In classes, law professors and some college teachers assign casebooks that are usually organized thematically and then chronologically within those themes. This volume is strictly chronological, which means that it may go from a case asking whether the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments ended racial segregation in public accommodations like a steamship or railroad, to a voting rights case, back to a public accommodations case, and on to a racial terrorism case, and so on. The introductions draw attention to how these cases are related, but the chronological organization makes it harder for readers to follow the legal issues. Casebooks often offer selections only from judicial opinions, which can be very long and technical, with extensive commentary by the author; they sometimes offer a host of accompanying documents to provide historical and legal context. Thus their value is in their editing and commentary. For example, a good casebook covering this era might offer something from Bradwell v. the State of Illinois (1872), where the Supreme Court denied that the Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges and immunities clause protected Myra Bradwell’s claim to admission to the state bar under Illinois law. Mackey’s volume offers Bradwell, and his introduction to the decision draws attention to Justice Joseph P. Bradley’s concurrence proclaiming that “the law of the Creator” declared a woman should be wife and mother only (p. 455). True enough, but the introduction does not acknowledge that Bradwell was a renowned legal editor or that the Illinois...

Indication of euthanasia is only one of several medical decisions at the end of life. Precise definition of this topic related to the clinical events happening around the sick-bed is not complete in the legal and medical literature. The present review attempts to classify the different end of life events with the aim of clarifying which of these do not belong to the concept of passive euthanasia. Euthanasia is not a legal category. The everyday expressions of active and passive euthanasia are simplifications, which cover actions of different purposes. Use of these in medical and legal literature can be confusing and misleading. We differentiate decisions at the end of life on basis of their purpose. Based on the definition and category of the Hungarian Doctors' Chamber, euthanasia is the act or the lack of action in order to mercifully shorten or end the life of a suffering fellow-man to help him. Concepts of active, passive and forced euthanasia are defined. The terms of indirect and intermediate euthanasia are not used in order to avoid misunderstanding. Help and participation of non-professionals in the implementation cannot be completely excluded from the concept of euthanasia, and we believe euthanasia is not merely related to doctors. We outline those medical decisions at the end of life which do not belong to the category of passive euthanasia, namely: withdrawal of ineffective and life sustaining treatments, letting go of the patient, contra-indication of therapy escalation, use of palliative therapy, pain-relieving treatment, compromise medicine, consideration of reanimation and choosing cost-effective therapy. We touch upon the subject of the living will, why it cannot be applied, and its relation to active and passive euthanasia. With reference to the legal regulation of life saving and life sustaining treatment, we deal with the expected spirit of medical legislation.

is an associate professor and healthcare practitioner in educational psychology. She is employed by the University of Pretoria in the Department of Educational Psychology, where she has gained extensive experience in, amongst others, clinical supervision of students in educational psychology. Together with her students, she consults with children, adolescents, and their families in the treatment of diverse psychological challenges. She has a special interest in the assessment and diagnosis of neurodevelopmental disorders in children. Helen Brown is a PhD fellow in the IPSS in the Faculty of Education at the UWC. She is also a member of the Strategy and Research Division of the Manufacturing, Engineering and Related Services Sector Education and Training Authority. Her PhD in education focused on artisan trade testing in the engineering technical and vocational education and training space (TVET). Her work in quality development of vocational education and training (VET) systems has been in the areas of large-scale competence diagnostics, professional development of TVET college lecturers, information and communications technology (ICT) teaching and learning platforms, and skills for the industrialisation of new product innovations.

This chapter considers the relation between judicial decisions and judicial opinions — more specifically, the question whether opinions are necessary or dispensable, and what light that question throws on the question of the relations between law and justice. It then looks at the relations between law and morality.

The Bern Convention aims to conserve wild flora and fauna and their natural habitats, especially those species and habitats whose conservation requires the cooperation of several states. Turkey became a party to the convention in 1984 and therefore made it binding in terms of domestic law. It was sought to answer the question of how effective the Bern Convention was in Turkish legislation and judicial decisions. For that purpose, first, comparison of the provisions of the Bern Convention with Turkish legislation is carried out by using a four-point scoring chart, and second, the effect of the convention on the judicial decisions was examined by considering whether the Bern Convention was clearly referred in the relevant judicial decisions—47 Council of State decisions were analyzed from 1984 to 2019. It is observed an improvement in Turkish wildlife legislation increased from 17 to 74% per the Bern Convention’s goals and objectives. The proportion of judicial decisions referred to the Bern Convention, which resulted in a positive ecological decision was 87.5%. Decisions that do not refer to the Bern Convention were 66% positive. A comprehensive evaluation of both judicial decisions and legislative analysis showed that there are many deficiencies, especially in terms of migratory species and interstate coordination. To improve judicial decisions, courts should be subjected to mandated capacity-building training/workshops concerning international conventions.

During the Reagan presidency a storm arose over the refusal of a small Presbyterian college to be regulated by the United States Department of Education. Arguably, not since the Dartmouth College case of 1818, when the Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Marshall prevented a public takeover of Dartmouth's charter, had national policymaking centered so intensively and symbolically on a private collegiate institution. By preserving private autonomy, Dartmouth College v. Woodward fostered a pluralistic and competitive system of higher education that in the post-World War I I era made American universities the envy of the world. The batde over Grove City College, still in recent memory, is significant less for its immediate outcome than for the light it sheds on the deepening entanglement of American higher education in the web of the expanding regulatory state.

The Austrian School of Economics has long been branded as a sort of radical laissez-faire wing within the economics profession, even much more “right-wing,” in fact, than Milton Friedman, the profession;'s most recognized “preacher” of the free-market. The economic journalist Alfred Malabre, Jr., for example, in his recent critical book on modern economics, Lost Prophets, argues that “the monetarism that Friedman and his followers were preaching was not quite as conservative as advertised. In fact, the University of Chicago professor was treading not far from the middle of the economic road, flanked on the left by the likes of Galbraith and Leontief and on the right by Hayek, along with such other Austrian-school luminaries as Hans Sennholz, chairman of the economics department at Grove City College in western Pennsylvania, and Ludwig von Mises, transplanted from Austria and finishing out a distinguished academic and writing career at New York University” (Malabre 1994, p. 144).

The Austrian School of Economics has long been branded as a sort of radical laissez-faire wing within the economics profession, even much more “right-wing,” in fact, than Milton Friedman, the profession;'s most recognized “preacher” of the free-market. The economic journalist Alfred Malabre, Jr., for example, in his recent critical book on modern economics, Lost Prophets, argues that “the monetarism that Friedman and his followers were preaching was not quite as conservative as advertised. In fact, the University of Chicago professor was treading not far from the middle of the economic road, flanked on the left by the likes of Galbraith and Leontief and on the right by Hayek, along with such other Austrian-school luminaries as Hans Sennholz, chairman of the economics department at Grove City College in western Pennsylvania, and Ludwig von Mises, transplanted from Austria and finishing out a distinguished academic and writing career at New York University” (Malabre 1994, p. 144).

The “best interests” of the is a legal term and a general clause, which determines the interpretation of the provisions by the authorities applying the law. On the one hand, the lack of a legal definition gives the court leeway in interpreting the law and allows for the maximisation of protection of a child's well-being also in situations unknown to the law. On the other hand, in the absence of a legal definition, there is conceptual heterogeneity in the law, psychology and related disciplines (pedagogy, sociology). The purpose of the article is an attempt to define the concept of a interest of the child from the psychological and legal point of view and in practical terms, i.e. for formulating psychological and judicial opinions. The paper presents regulations on the best interests of the that are in force in Poland, and other selected legislation. The text also includes auxiliary interpretations of the term, which are not sources of law (in Poland): in the area of law – judicial decisions, in the area of psychology and related disciplines – guidelines on psychological and judicial opinions in cases in which the best interests of the are resolved. A special place was devoted to the 14-factor BIC model and the Best Interests of the Child Questionnaire developed on its basis by Kalverboer et al. (2012). The questionnaire is used to assess the best interest of the by analysing the quality of the current care and upbringing and the child's expectations regarding the future upbringing environment, thus supporting the decision-making by specialists from different jurisdictions. In addition, the concept of the best interest of the was included in psychological concepts (e.g. from the perspective of developmental psychology, family psychology, psycho-prevention, or in psychotherapy) and in related disciplines.

In order to be able to evaluate argumentation supporting judicial decisions, certain norms of reasonableness will have to be agreed upon. These norms will enable us to decide on the soundness of the argumentation. Various publications demonstrated that the pragma-dialectical argumentation theory, in which norms with respect to the quality of argumentation are clearly articulated, provides a useful tool for the evaluation of argumentation underlying judicial decisions. In legal theory as well as in argumentation theory, legislative decisions may be conceived as judicial decisions. This is, however, not to say that the same norms should apply for the justification of both types of decisions. For an adequate analysis and evaluation of legal and legislative decisions, it is of importance to ascertain which general and which specific norms play a role in the legal procedure and the legislative process. On the basis of a case on Dutch legislation, this contribution discusses some of the problems that may arise if a pragma-dialectical analysis and evaluation of the argumentation in the legislative process does not sufficiently take into account the specific context in which the argumentation is put forward.

In The Economic Prerequisite to Democracy, Dan Usher tries to prove that capitalism is necessary for the survival of democracy, defined as majority rule by means of a popularly-elected legislature. Usher assumes that this survival requires general agreement both on the legislative majority-rule method and on certain substantive issues. This assumption turns out to be doubtful. Usher believes that the issues most likely to provoke serious disagreement are ‘assignment’ issues; that is, those issues which involve the stability of the positions assigned to individuals in the economic rank order. Some of his reasons for this belief do not seem valid, although the belief is somewhat plausible. Usher asserts that to prevent serious disagreement from disrupting legislative majority rule, assignment issues must be largely decided by a ‘system of equity’. Usher's reasoning here is unconvincing. Finally, Usher states that (the present form of) capitalism is the only practicable system of equity. This statement is open to doubt. Usher has not proved that capitalism is necessary for the survival of democracy. One implication of Usher's argument is that major reassignment by the legislature will be strongly opposed by the economically superior ranked. Another is that some of the most important issues—assignment issues—should be largely kept out of the legislative majority decision; in other words, democracy must be curtailed in order to survive.

The ITE Law is considered as a strong legal basis to control social media and regulate information technology, as stipulated in Law No. 11/2008 and its amendment in Law No. 19/2016. This law applies to anyone, both at home and abroad, if their actions harm the interests of Indonesia. Consumer protection is an important aspect of the modern economy to ensure equitable and ethical practices in the marketplace. This research discusses the concept of consumer protection in the context of consumer rights in Indonesia and how such protection is applied in an ever-evolving market. The main focus of this research is how the ITE Law handles defamation from a legal perspective. Using a normative juridical approach, this research examines relevant legislation, legal literature, and court decisions. This research examines legislation, legal literature, and relevant court decisions. In practice, ITE Law often faces challenges, such as differences in interpretation of articles that have the potential to limit freedom of speech as well as debates over the line between criticism and defamation. The results indicate that even though the ITE Law provides a clear legal basis, its implementation is still a cause for controversy. A balance is needed between the protection of individual reputation and freedom of expression. Regulatory reform and increasing legal awareness in the community are important steps to ensure a fairer and more effective application of the ITE Law.

Executive branch agencies typically use a process of to permit the public to respond to the proposed text of rules. The legal literature has not considered whether a similar process would be helpful for the judicial branch. In this Article, Professors Abramowicz and Colby argue that it would be. Neither the parties to a litigation nor third parties generally have an opportunity to comment on judicial opinions after they are drafted but before they are made final. As a result, judicial opinions often contain errors and frequently have far-ranging and unanticipated negative consequences. A notice-and-comment system could mitigate these concerns, and could also help to constrain judges to follow the rule of law and to improve the legitimacy of the judicial process.

This paper examines how communication underpins the historical, structural, and interpretive development of constitutional law. Constitutional law is a multifaceted domain shaped not only by judicial decisions but also by socio-political discourse, international exchange, and symbolic expression. Communication through judicial opinions, public discourse, and technological mediums facilitates the construction, interpretation, and transmission of constitutional meaning. From pre-constitutional charters to modern-day transnational legal borrowings, communication processes allow constitutional values to evolve, migrate, and adapt to new contexts. The study also considers the interplay between judicial communication, legal pluralism, and public engagement in constitutional democracies, highlighting how law is made intelligible and authoritative through language, symbols, and discourse. Drawing on interdisciplinary approaches from law, linguistics, and anthropology, this work underscores the indispensable role of communication in shaping the legitimacy, accessibility, and adaptability of constitutional frameworks. Keywords: Constitutional development, Legal communication, Judicial opinion, Constitutional interpretation, Public discourse, Pre-constitutional texts, Transnational constitutionalism, Legal semiotics.

To public, judges handing down judicial decisions present arguments arrived through rational discourse and literal language. Yet, as Judge Richard Posner has pointed out, Rhetorical power counts for a lot in law. Science, not to mention everyday thought, is influenced by metaphors. Why shouldn t law be? Haig Bosmajian examines crucial role of tropemetaphors, personifications, metonymiesin argumentation and reveals surprisingly important place that figurative, nonliteral language holds in judicial decision making.Focusing on specific genre of legal opinion, Professor Bosmajian discusses question of why we have judicial opinions at all and importance of style in them. He then looks at specific well-known figures of speech such as the wall of separation between church and state, justice personified as a female, or Constitution as colorblind, explaining why they are not straightforward statements of legal fact but examples of ways tropes are used in legal language.A useful example can be found in Judge Learned Hand s response to a 1943 case involving news gathering and monopoly. Hand found need to protect public s right to dissemination of news from as many different sources, and with as many different facets and colors possible, an interest closely akin to, if indeed it is not same as, interest protected by First Amendment; it presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will be folly; but we have staken upon it our all.