Abstract

The aim of this paper is to put forward a simplified model which may help to explain the workings and performance of public entities in Spain. Starting from a bilateral monopoly characterization, we shall take into account the working rules, the decision-making mechanisms and the system of rewards and penalties in Spanish public administrations. This implies introducing different assumptions about the demand and the costs conditions what will lead us obtain meaningful distinct results from those reached in the standard models of bureaucratic behavior.

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