A mixed motive approach to lobbying: applying game theory to analyse the impact of co‐operation and conflict on perceived lobbying success

Abstract

Abstract This study was motivated by the apparent discrepancy between guidance for public relations best practice using co‐operation and collaboration to resolve conflict, and the potential to use the positive elements of conflict and competition to lobby more effectively. Game theory matrix was applied to nine lobbying campaigns, and used narrative analysis to identify themes of co‐operation, conflict, and mixed motive lobbying in the transcripts. The primary research identified that: Conflict, co‐operation and mixed‐motive lobbying were apparent in all the case studies. Mixed motive lobbying was unattainable between organizations with diametrically opposed interests and this may limit its application. A further obstacle to mixed motive strategies is the high level of resources it uses. The numerical game theory matrix used in this study was of limited use, however, the conceptual framework the theory provided was effective at modelling conflict and co‐operation strategies. Formal co‐operative alliances were common in the sample. Smaller coalitions appeared to be more effective than the larger ones. Those engaged in high conflict campaigns perceived themselves to be more effective than those engaged in lower conflict campaigns, however, this would need to be examined more exhaustively to establish causality. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.