Abstract
It is widely acknowledged that some truths or facts don’t have a minimal full ground [see e.g. Fine (Metaphysical grounding, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p 57, 2012a)]. Every full ground of them contains a smaller full ground. In this paper I’ll propose a minimality constraint on immediate grounding and I’ll show that it doesn’t fall prey to the arguments that tell against an unqualified minimality constraint. Furthermore, the assumption that all cases of grounding can be understood in terms of immediate grounding will be defended. This assumption guarantees that the proposed minimality constraint is significant for all cases of grounding. With its help one can get a clear grip on the relevance of grounding, a feature that will be put to use in the penultimate section.
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