A Military History of Russia, from Ivan the Terrible to the War in Chechnya by David R. Stone (review)

Abstract

550 seer, 86, 3, july 2008 were found to that end. As Herberstein noticed (orwas told by his Russian minders), the trinityof titlesTsar, Autocrat and Great Sovereign was a terrestrial reflection of the Holy Trinity. The eschatological expectations thereby generated stimulated the lettered class both spiritually and politically. If this was one means of bolstering the legitimacy of Moscow's ruler, ge nealogical inheritance was another. Ivan claimed imperial blood by virtue of his descent from the union ofGrand Prince Vladimir and theByzantine prin cess Anna. However, insurance was subsequently taken out in the form of genealogies tracing his successors' descent from the Emperor Augustus's brother, Prus and, indeed, from themythical Romulus. Ivan IV assumed the tideTsar in 1547, although a conclave ofOrthodox prelates inConstantinople did not endorse the entitlement until 1561 and it stillhad to be legitimized internationally. In 1549 the designation 'orthodox' was added; and then the preface 'By grace of God'. The phrase 'ofAll Russia', originally a term of respect, is a different case because it came to represent a claim to territory,though ithad differentmeanings for different parties. For Orthodox Russians the term came to imply an obligation to incorporate all territories whose populations had once been Orthodox, whereas forCatholic Lithuanians and Poles ithad ethnic rather than religious connotations, an example of difficulties arising from contrasting political cultures. As late as 1500, argues Fliushkin, Muscovy still regarded its territoryas a conflation of hereditary properties, and itwas slow to develop a concept of the state.However, the chief defining point ofMuscovite political culture was a theocratic idea of the ruler. The Muscovite establishment despised elective credentials. When Stephan Batory was elected King of Poland, Ivan com pared him to thebiblical King Saul who had been acclaimed by the Israelites, by contrast to the God-chosen King David. Even though exigencies of the moment compelled the Tsar to sue for peace, he insisted on adopting a posi tion ofmoral superiority,presenting itas an act ofChristian piety. This made obedience to the Tsar's commands a religious as well as a political obligation, and invested Muscovy's policies with a moral dimension. It also proclaimed the state to be an instrument of redemption. Filiushkin's is an extensive, conscientious, and occasionally illuminating account, though it isunlikely to end all arguments in the area. Unfortunately, themaps intended to show the relationship of possessions to territorial titles are very unclear. London Philip Longworth Stone, David R. A Military History ofRussia, from Ivan the Terrible to the War inChechnya.Praeger Security International. Westport, CT and London, 2006. xiv + 259 pp. Maps. Suggested reading. Index. $49.95: ?28.99. David Stone is best known for a highly regarded study of the Soviet military build-up in the early 1930s (HammerandRifle: TheMilitarization of the SovietUnion, ig26-igjj, Lawrence, KS, 2000; reviewed in SEER, 79, 2001, 4, REVIEWS 55I pp. 763-65). This era gets relatively brief attention in his ambitious new volume, which within a small compass offers the layman an accurate and objective survey of the evolution of Russia's armed forces over the last five hundred years, along with competent analyses of theprincipal campaigns they fought. The focus is quite properly on strategy and tactics, equipment, size and structure, and leading commanders' performance ? the stuff of tradi tionalmilitary history.Yet we are also told enough about the domestic scene and foreign-policy problems to understand why Russia so often found herself at war. Whether somuch belligerency was justifiable in terms of the 'national interest', however defined, is a matter of opinion. Stone wastes little time on such speculations, or in assessing the heavy burdens that 'a society organized for war' (p. xii) imposed upon civilians. Nor does he present a currently fash ionable 'view from below' of ordinary soldiers' battlefield experiences. Instead we get pungent evaluations of the quality of Russia's military leaders over the centuries. Top marks go to A. A. Brusilov, who in 1916 performed 'a masterful job' inpreparing his offensive on the South-western front,only tobe letdown by GHQand his counterparts to the north (pp. 168-70). Interestingly,his ex ample inspired the Soviet generals (latermarshals) G. K. Zhukov and A. M. Vasilevskii when they directed...