A Methodology to Apply a Game Theoretic Model of Security Risks Interdependencies Between ICT and Electric Infrastructures

Abstract

In the last decade, the power grid has increasingly relied on the communication infrastructure for the management and control of grid operations. In a previous work, we proposed an analytical model for identifying and hardening the most critical communication equipment used in the power system. Using non-cooperative game theory, we modeled the interactions between an attacker and a defender and derived the minimum defense resources required and the optimal strategy of the defender that minimizes the risk on the power system. In this paper, we aim at validating the model using data derived from real-world existing systems. In particular, we propose a methodology to assess the values of the parameters used in the analytical model to evaluate the impact of equipment failures in the power system and attacks in the communication infrastructure. Using this methodology, we then validate our model via a case study based on the polish electric power transmission system.