A Method to Detect Prefix Hijacking by Using Ping Tests

Abstract

We propose an improved technique to detect BGP (Border Gateway Protocol) prefix hijacking. BGP prefix hijacking is caused by improper BGP routing information advertisements. When an AS's prefix is hijacked by an improper BGP routing information advertisement from another AS, the hijacked AS can not communicate with other ASs because traffic to the prefix is delivered to the hijacking AS, not the hijacked AS. The method used in major detection systems, such as ENCORE and Keiro-Bugyo, validates each BGP routing information update against BGP routing information stored in IRR (Internet Routing Registry) databases. In order for this method to work, correct BGP routing information must be stored in the IRR. If BGP routing information is advertised to the Internet before being registered with the IRR, it is considered as an instance of prefix hijacking, even if the advertised routing information is valid. We propose a method of detecting prefix hijacking that uses ping tests from two or more ASs. The key idea is that, when an AS receives a BGP update, it executes ping tests to the received prefix; another AS, one that has not received that update also performs similar ping tests. Test results are compared to decide whether prefix hijacking has occurred or not.