Abstract

Sybil attack can counterfeit traffic scenario by sending false messages with multiple identities, which often causes traffic jams and even leads to vehicular accidents in vehicular ad hoc network (VANET). It is very difficult to be defended and detected, especially when it is launched by some conspired attackers using their legitimate identities. In this paper, we propose an event based reputation system (EBRS), in which dynamic reputation and trusted value for each event are employed to suppress the spread of false messages. EBRS can detect Sybil attack with fabricated identities and stolen identities in the process of communication, it also defends against the conspired Sybil attack since each event has a unique reputation value and trusted value. Meanwhile, we keep the vehicle identity in privacy. Simulation results show that EBRS is able to defend and detect multi-source Sybil attacks with high performances.

Highlights

  • As an important part of Intelligent Transportation System (ITS), vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) has been developed rapidly in the past twenty years

  • A legitimate identity gives a license for vehicle to act as an internal node in VANET, but the identity-based security is vulnerable to Sybil attack

  • Sybil attacker A might create the illusion of a vehicle S passing the traffic congestion area smoothly, A has the legitimate identity and it can share its identity with the accomplices

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Summary

Introduction

As an important part of Intelligent Transportation System (ITS), VANET has been developed rapidly in the past twenty years. Different from the Delay-tolerant networks [2,3,4], the characteristics of fast and dynamic topology, autonomous movement and the influence of traffic rules, road and weather conditions bring many security threats to VANET [5, 6]. To deal with these threats, many applications of VANET give each vehicle a unique identity, and take some security rules and methods with these identities.

Related work
Detection methods Applicable environment Communication
Attack model
Initialization and notation
Process of local certificate generation
Process of local certificate validation
Process of setting event reputation value and trusted value
System evaluation
Simulation results analysis
Performance evaluation
Conclusion and future work
Full Text
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